


Compositional cyber-physical systems modeling




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
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
Cyber-physical systems are ubiquitous




Each leaf node has its own formalism but relations are largely informal




Designing cyber-physical systems
requires tracing different model views



But what are the traces?




Designing cyber-physical systems requires tracing different model views



Our aim is to build a metatheory for *compositional* system theory

systems as boxes
inhabitants



channels of info
flow as wires

To combat:


- Semantic ambiguity
- Complexity of *models*
- Intractability between different model views

Category theory leads to unification and scalability


Formal representation of processes
and interactions (dynamic view)

Relational ontologies (static view)

Putting the applied in category theory requires us to use it as a language




Wiring diagrams bridge behaviors, requirements, and architectures




Wiring diagrams formalize processes and interactions


Objects are pairs of sets $X = (X_{in}, X_{out})$



Morphisms are functions $(X_{out} \times Y_{in} \xrightarrow{\varphi_{in}} X_{in}, X_{out} \xrightarrow{\varphi_{out}} Y_{out})$




Has a tensor product $X \otimes Y = (X_{in} \times Y_{in}, X_{out} \times Y_{out})$




Wiring diagrams model systems as algebras

Start with three boxes $\mathbb{R} \text{---} [X] \text{---} \mathbb{R}$, $\mathbb{R} \text{---} [Y] \text{---} \mathbb{R}$ and $\mathbb{R} \text{---} [Z] \text{---} \mathbb{R}$ where all input and output data of possible processes are real numbers, interconnected as in



This is a morphism $X \otimes Y \otimes Z \rightarrow A$ in the category **WD** expressed as




$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \phi_{\text{in}}: \underbrace{\mathbb{R} \times \mathbb{R} \times \mathbb{R}}_{(X \otimes Y \otimes Z)_{\text{out}}} \times \underbrace{\mathbb{R} \times \mathbb{R} \times \mathbb{R}}_{A_{\text{in}}} \xrightarrow{\pi_{12456}} \underbrace{\mathbb{R} \times \mathbb{R} \times \mathbb{R} \times \mathbb{R} \times \mathbb{R}}_{(X \otimes Y \otimes Z)_{\text{in}}} \\ \phi_{\text{out}}: \underbrace{\mathbb{R} \times \mathbb{R} \times \mathbb{R}}_{(X \otimes Y \otimes Z)_{\text{out}}} \xrightarrow{\pi_3} \underbrace{\mathbb{R}}_{A_{\text{out}}} \end{array} \right.$$

Wiring diagrams address emergence


A **WD**-algebra, namely a monoidal functor

$$\begin{array}{ccc}
 F: \mathbf{WD} & \longrightarrow & \mathbf{Cat} \\
 X=(X_{\text{in}}, X_{\text{out}}) & \longmapsto & FX \quad \text{subsystems category} \\
 \downarrow \phi & & \downarrow F\phi \quad \text{composite system functor} \\
 Y=(Y_{\text{in}}, Y_{\text{out}}) & \longmapsto & FY
 \end{array}$$

gives *semantics* to boxes, *composite operation* to wiring diagrams and *parallelizing operation* to subsystems via $FX \times FY \rightarrow F(X \otimes Y)$




Wiring diagrams allow us to formalize and relate each of these model views



$$f_{\text{in}}: \mathbb{R}^3 \times \mathbb{R}^2 \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^5, (s', c, s, e, d) \mapsto (e, s, d, s', c)$$
$$f_{\text{out}}: \mathbb{R}^3 \rightarrow \mathbb{R}, (s', c, s) \mapsto s$$

Wiring diagrams allow us to formalize and relate each of these model views




The insight that we formally capture with category theory is the *meaning* of the traces between model views


$$B: \mathbf{W} \longrightarrow \mathbf{Cat}$$

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \boxed{A} & \longmapsto & B(\boxed{A}) \\ f \downarrow & & \downarrow B(f) \\ \boxed{UAV} & \longmapsto & B(\boxed{UAV}) \end{array}$$

A categorical formulation allows for percolating constraints



Category theory has the potential to unify and scale system models




The future of safety and security coengineering

(Step 1) Produce a contracts algebra that captures a subset of safety requirements

(Step 2) Model attacker actions over the systems model

⇒ *Unify* safety and security models for cyber-physical systems

Compositional cyber-physical systems modeling



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